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Abstract
An information asymmetry exists in the market for organic produce since
consumers cannot determine whether produce is organically or conventionally
grown.  Various methods may solve this problem including signaling, reputation,
and certification.  Signaling and reputation may not work well, because signals are
noisy, and reputation may be difficult for a producer to establish.  Certification of
the farm and its growing methods shows the most promise.  A survey instrument
testing the efficacy of certification is presented along with empirical analysis
suggesting that no notable difference existed between independent certification
methods, although independent certification had significantly different effects than
self-certification.
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Introduction
How do consumers know whether the produce they buy is organic?  Many stores
have an organic produce section, and various claims regarding growing methods are
made.  Generally speaking, organic produce commands a premium price (Lohr),
although absent labels, distinguishing between organically and conventionally
grown fruit and vegetables is quite difficult.  This may cause consumers to be
suspicious about any claims regarding growing methods.  The information
asymmetry that causes this problem has aspects of both moral hazard (hidden
actions) and adverse selection (hidden characteristics).
In this paper, we discuss the theory of asymmetric information and its application
to the market for organic produce.  The literature suggests certification resolves
asymmetry, although only if certification is credible and believed.  The USDA has
recently established standards and instituted an inspection and certification
program for organic produce (see the National Organic Program homepage,
www.ams.usda.gov/nop).  Additionally, individual producers, stores, some states
and many third party organizations certify produce as “organic.”  To test the ability
of these programs to resolve problems caused by information asymmetry, we
analyze data from a recently administered survey asking questions about consumer
response to various certifying organizations.  This leads to preliminary conclusions
regarding the efficacy of various types of certification, and their probable effect on
purchases of organic produce.
Information Asymmetry and Organic Produce
A principal-agent model such as that presented in Akerlof may be used to describe
the market for organic produce.i  Organic produce is perceived by some consumers
as higher quality than conventionally grown produce, but organic growing methods
are more costly than conventional methods.  Absent credible certification, buyers
have limited means to verify whether the fruit and vegetables they purchase are
organically or conventionally grown, since buyers are generally limited to visual
inspection before purchase, and eating the produce after purchase.  Because of this,
growers are tempted to label all produce organic, whether or not it was organically
produced.  This is the problem of adverse selection (hidden characteristics).  Even
when buyers are willing to pay a large premium for organically grown produce, it is
not likely to appear on the market.  As long as consumers cannot verify the claims
made for the produce, growers will be tempted to claim to have produced organically
while actually using conventional methods, as this reduces their costs and increases
their profits. This is the problem of moral hazard (hidden action).  Asymmetric
information means that organically grown produce is less available for consumers
who are willing to pay for it.iiR. Ward et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 7, Issue 1, 2004
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There are several ways to resolve these problems.  The first suggests that if
consumers can observe some signal of product quality (e.g., number of blemishes,
size of the fruit, variations in color), then they can assess the likelihood that organic
methods were used.  In theory, consumers could then set up a pricing scheme that
involves higher payment for increasing likelihood of organic production methods.
Under this pricing scheme, farmers are either rewarded for using organic growing
methods or punished for using conventional methods.  Grossman and Hart present
the generally accepted methodology for using signals to set up such a pricing
scheme, and demonstrate that noisier signals and smaller willingness-to-pay
differentials make it harder to reduce moral hazard.  Cosmetic appearance seems to
be a noisy signal according to Thompson and Kidwell, who found that organic
produce did not always have more cosmetic defects.
Problems caused by information asymmetry can also be overcome through the
establishment of a reputation.  Repeated interaction between the producer and the
consumer allows for development of a reputation (Heal), because consumers are
able to withhold future purchases from farmers caught using conventional methods.
Even without repeat purchases, as long as new consumers are able to discover the
farmer’s reputation, information asymmetry may be eliminated.  However,
reputation works only if consumers can discover that conventional growing methods
are being used, and only if consumers can punish the offending producer.  Neither of
these conditions is likely to be met, as organic produce is a credence good
(McCluskey), and the food system is so complex that tracing products to an
individual grower is nearly impossible.
Finally, problems of information asymmetry can be avoided if growers are able to
make verifiable claims regarding production methods, through certification or
licensing.  A publicly available standard for what constitutes organic produce could
make growers willing to use organic (more expensive) methods, as long as it leads to
higher prices or sales.  According to Lohr, certification removes asymmetric
information by providing consumers assurances regarding the production methods
used and ensuring producers that conventional growers will not be able to make
claims to produce organically.  As noted above, the USDA recently established
national standards for organically grown products along with a system of
inspections to support truth in labeling regulations.  Other programs have also been
created to certify organic produce, and while some are more stringent than the
USDA standards, few are as well known or as widely applied.iii
In order for certification to reduce information asymmetry, however, consumers
must believe the certifying organization.  Consumer disbelief reduces willingness to
pay, which makes covering the higher cost of organic methods difficult, and reduces
the likelihood that producers will actually use them. The more trust the consumer
places in the certifying organization, the more likely it is that she will be willing toR. Ward et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 7, Issue 1, 2004
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pay a higher price for certified organically grown produce, and the more effective
the certification program will be in enlarging the market for organic produce.
Thompson reviews the literature on consumer demand for organic foods, and
suggests that demand is positively related to household size, and has a mixed
relationship to age (young and older middle-aged adults tend to buy the most
organic produce).  Education has an interesting effect in that it is positively related
to demand unless post-graduate education is pursued in which case the opposite
holds.  While Thompson suggests that income may not be related to organic
purchases, he notes that national studies generally suggest a positive relationship
between income and organic consumption.  In the studies he reviews, gender and
marital status appear to have no significant effect on the propensity to purchase
organic food.  As for the propensity to purchase certified organic produce, we posit
that price increases due to certification (shifting the supply curve) and consumer
confidence in the certifying agency (shifting the demand curve) should also
influence purchasing behavior.
While much theoretical literature exists on certification as a way to overcome
information asymmetry, and several studies have examined the characteristics of
organic produce, this paper considers the effects of certification of organic produce.iv
Our goal is to examine the efficacy of certification as a way to increase credibility of
claims about production methods and thereby increase the size of the market for
organic produce.
The Study
To determine the efficacy of a certification program, a survey was designed using
the telephone-based Questionnaire Programming Language survey language
(United States General Accounting Office).v   The survey was administered to a
random digit dial sample of Utah residents via telephone from the end of May to
early June 2001.  Three thousand phone numbers were used, from which nine
hundred thirty-three usable responses were obtained, for a raw response rate of
31.1%.  The remaining numbers were disconnected telephone numbers and people
that could not be reached (1,145), people who refused to participate (798), lost
responses from a corrupted disk (fewer than 20), or unusable responses because
respondents did not complete the survey, leading to an adjusted response rate of
50.3%.
Upon contact, the person most responsible for purchasing groceries was identified
and interviewed. Depending on how they answered preliminary questions, they
were asked a set of questions regarding how five types of certification would change
their purchases of organic produce.  Figure 1 illustrates the order of questioning,
and gives the number of respondents to each set of questions.R. Ward et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 7, Issue 1, 2004
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Respondents were first asked whether or not they purchased organic produce.  If
they did, several questions regarding the amount and reasons for purchasing
organic produce were asked.  If the respondent did not purchase organic produce,
they were asked if they thought that certification was important for organic
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Respondents who indicated that certification was important to them were then
asked to indicate how certification by five different agents – the farmer, the retailer,
an independent organization (such as Good Housekeeping), the Utah state
government, or the federal government – would affect the quantity of organic
produce they purchase.  We used a 5-point categorical (Likert-type) response scale,
including “greatly increase,” “increase,” “not change,” “decrease” and “greatly
decrease.”  Note that the responses “decrease” and “greatly decrease” would be
unexpected for any certifying agency.
These respondents were then asked how certification would affect their purchase of
organic produce if it added 10 percent to the current price, using the same response
scale.  For all respondents for whom certification was not important, but who might
purchase organic produce, the question regarding the 10 percent price increase for
certified organic produce was posed.  All respondents were asked questions
regarding socioeconomic characteristics of the household.  Respondents who
purchased organic produce or who indicated “appearance” or “other” as reasons for
not purchasing organic produce were asked if appearance or labeling with respect to
growth, care and shipping affected their purchase of organic produce.
The Model
We used the data to examine two issues - the effect of certification on purchases of
organically grown produce, and the effect of a price increase (caused by certification)
on purchases of certified produce.  In the first model, an ordered probit regression is
used to examine both the size and significance of the relationship between various
demographic variables and the qualitative change in amount of organic produce
purchased due to type of certification.  As further discussed below, an ordered probit
is appropriate for these data, as the responses are categorical, ranging from “greatly
decrease” to “greatly increase”.   In short, this regression is an attempt to determine
if certification shifts the demand curve.  Recall that questions were asked about five
types of certifying agencies.  Thus, five observations of the dependent variable were
obtained from each respondent.  Repeated observations of the same household
makes the data set a “panel”, which influences the choice of regression techniques
described below.  A list of variable names and descriptions is given in Table 1.
Following the discussion in Thompson, which examined purchasing behavior for
organic (certified or not) food, the following model was hypothesized:
(1)  Purchaseij = β0+ β1 * Buy Organici + β2 * Household Incomei + β3 * Household Sizei  + β4 * Genderi
+ β5 * Agei + β6 * Agei2+ β7 * Educationi
+ β8 * Educationi2 + β9 * Farm Certification + β10 * Store Certification  +β11 *
Independent Certification + β12 * State Government Certification + εij
where i indexes households (respondents) and j indexes certification type.R. Ward et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 7, Issue 1, 2004
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Table 1: Description of Regressors and Summary Statistics
Variable Description Frequency Mean Std. Dev.
Purchaseij
Organic produce purchase response to certification, without price increase.
5=Greatly incr, 4=Increase, 3=No change, 2=Decrease, 1=Greatly Decr.
Purchase2ij Same as Purchase but a price increase of 10 percent is included.
Buy Organici (n=933) Does the respondent currently
purchase organic produce?
1 = No




= 31.08% 1.687 .915
Agei (n=933) Age of the respondent.
1 = 18-25 years
2 = 26 - 35
3 = 36 - 45
4 = 46 - 55
5 = 56 - 65








= .97% 3.360 1.745
Genderi (n=933) Male = 1, Female = 2 1.692 .462
Educationi (n=933) Highest level of education obtained.
 1 = grade school
2 = Some high school
3 = high school
4 = Some college
5 = Bachelor’s






= 7.93% 4.077 1.021
Household Sizei (n=933) Number  living in household. 3.109 1.866
Household Incomei (n=933) Household income level.
1 = < $15,000
2 = $15 - 30 K
3 = $30 - 50 K
4 = $50 - 75K
5= $75-100 K
6 = $100 - 150 K
7 = $150 - 250 K










= 21.76% 3.210 1.420
Farm Certification Dummy variable for farm level certification programs.
Store Certification Dummy variable for a store certification program.
Independent Cert. Dummy variable for an independent third party certifying agency.
Utah Gov. Cert. Dummy variable for Utah state government certification.
Federal Certification Dummy variable for federal government certification.
Greatly Inc. Org. Pur.ij Certification  greatly increases organic produce purchase. (Purchaseij =5)
Increase Org. Purchaseij Certification would increase organic purchases. (Purchaseij = 4)
No Change Org. Pur.ij Certification would not change organic produce purchases. (Purchaseij = 3)
Decrease Org. Pur.ij Certification would decrease organic produce purchases.  (Purchaseij = 2)
Grtly. Decrease Org. Pur.ij Certification greatly decreases organic produce purchases.  (Purchaseij = 1)
Certification was expected to increase organic produce consumption for respondents
with higher income levels, larger household sizes, and who currently buy organic
produce, suggesting that β1, β2 and β3 should be positive.  While certification and
socio-economic variables may influence whether a respondent purchases organic
produce, the variable “Buy Organic” is assumed exogenous, as it describes current
behavior with or without certification, while our endogenous variable (Purchase)
describes future behavior in response to certification. We expected that women
would be more likely to purchase organic produce, so that β4 should also be positive
(Thompson concluded insignificance). According to Thompson, the relationship
between age, education and purchases of organic produce is non-linear, so that the
expected signs of β5 through β8 are unclear.  Household size and the presence ofR. Ward et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 7, Issue 1, 2004
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children under 18 were highly correlated (over 80 percent correlation coefficient), so
household size was used here.  Thompson and Kidwell along with Loureiro,
McCluskey and Mittelhammer found that the presence of children under 18
increased purchases of organic products.  Thompson argued that the ages of
children would be important and pointed to the size of the organic baby food
market.  While Thompson notes that the influence of children’s ages on purchases of
organic produce is not well understood (and therefore of interest in any study of
organic produce), the contribution of this survey is the influence of certification on
purchases of organic produce.  Questions regarding the age of children in the
household were not included in the survey described here.
Dummy variables for each of the certification programs were included in the above
model with federal certification used as the base case.  If federal certification is
most credible, β9 through β12 should be negative.  If (as is hypothesized) self-
certification, whether by the farmer or a retailer, is least credible, larger (absolute
value) impacts should be observed for the farm and store certification methods.
The categorical responses regarding the effects of certification by various
organizations on levels of consumption (greatly increase to greatly decrease) were
analyzed using ordered probit estimations.vi  Since each respondent gave answers
for each of the five certification categories, the analysis had to account for the panel
nature of the data.  This was accomplished using a generalized estimating equation
method to correct for the potential non-independence of observations.  The
estimations “grouped” the data so that demographic variables were held constant
for each respondent, but response to each certification type was allowed to vary.
Note that in an ordered probit model the effect of a given independent variable can
only be interpreted relative to smallest (greatly decrease) and largest (greatly
increase) categories, so that conclusions about intermediate responses cannot be
made.
To address our second objective, examining the effects of a price increase due to
certification on organic purchases, we asked how respondents would react to five
different types of certification if the retail price increased by 10 percent.  As before,
the data set contains five observations for each respondent, a “panel”, and
regression analysis will have to control for this.  From these questions, a new model
was formulated where the independent variables include those indicating whether
the respondent was currently buying organic produce, household income, household
size, gender, age and education level of respondent, dummy variables for the type of
certification, and dummy variables for the change in purchase of certified organic
produce without a price increase.  This regression is run using the same households
as were used in the first regression, which ensures that household qualities not
measured are held constant across regressions, so that the second regression
captures the effect of an increase in price due to certification.  Comparing thisR. Ward et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 7, Issue 1, 2004
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model to the one above will allow us to examine the effects of a price increase on
purchases of organic produce.  See Table 1 for a description of the variables.
(2)  Purchase2ij=β 0 + β 1* Buy Organici + β 2 * Household Incomei + β 3 * Household Sizei
 + β4 * Genderi + β5 * Agei + β6 * Agei 2 + β7 * Educationi
+ β8 * Educationi 2 + β9 * Farm Certification + β10 * Store Certification
+ β11 * Independent Certification + β12 * State Government Certification
+ β13 * Increase Org. Pur.ij  + β14 * No Change Org. Purchaseij
+ β15 * Decrease Org. Pur.ij + β16 * Greatly Decrease Org. Pur.ij + εij
Dummy variables for purchase response to certification without a price increase
were included as a proxy for belief in certification, with “greatly increase” serving as
the base.  The effect of the price increase was expected to be smallest in absolute
terms for those who indicated certification would greatly increase their purchases,
since these consumers are believed to value certification the most and be less
sensitive to a change in price.  Because “greatly increase” is the base, β13 through β16
are predicted to be negative, indicating that less responsive consumers were more
sensitive to a 10 percent price increase.  It is further expected that in absolute
terms the coefficients should be ordered from β13 (smallest) through β16 (largest),
suggesting a greater sensitivity to price increases for people who respond negatively
to certification.
One might expect that the coefficients on demographic variables should behave
similarly whether or not the price of organic produce increases, but the dummy
variables from the first regression capture the effects of certification on organic
purchases.   Thus, the signs of β1 through β8 are more difficult to predict in this
model.  People who already purchase organic produce and those with higher
incomes are likely to be less sensitive to a price increase, so β1 and β2 should be
positive.  The signs of β3, through β8 are not predicted here, as they give the effect of
the respective variable on responsiveness to a price increase, rather than the effect
of this variable on responsiveness to certification.  As before, self-certification (farm
and store) is not expected to be as believable as independent certification
(independent, state, and federal government).  This implies that β9 and β10 should
be negative.  The coefficients on other certification methods should also be negative
but smaller in absolute value.
Results
The sample was fairly representative of the Utah population as a whole.  Table 2
compares the sample statistics with Utah census results from 2000 (Bureau of the
Census).  The sample included a larger percentage of females than in the general
population.  This is not surprising, as the survey asked for the person primarily
responsible for purchasing groceries.  Table 2 also gives a summary of the produce
buying habits of respondents, as well as their knowledge and views of certification.
While most respondents were aware that there were requirements for certification,R. Ward et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 7, Issue 1, 2004
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only 10% looked for it when purchasing organic produce.  This was about a third of
those who purchase organic produce.
Table 2: Sample Demographics and other Survey Data along with a Comparison
with Utah Census Data
Item Sample Utah Census *
Household Size 3.11 persons 3.13 persons
Children Under 18 in Household 42 percent 45.8 percent
Gender (% female) 70 percent 49.9 percent
Aware of Certification Programs 47 percent Na
Purchase Organic Produce 31 percent Na
Look for Certification 10 percent Na
Aware of Requirements for Certification 75 percent Na
Uniform Standards Important 89 percent Na
na=data not available
* Source:  United States Bureau of the Census.




















Farm 9.3 30.0 51.2 8.5 0.8 3.38 0.804
Retailer 6.2 33.4 50.4 8.5 1.4 3.35 0.779
Indpdt. Third party 14.4 47.0 34.3 3.3 0.8 3.71 0.785
Utah State Gov. 11.6 50.7 31.7 5.4 0.6 3.67 0.772
Federal Government 16.1 44.2 31.7 5.9 2.0 3.67 0.886
With a 10% Price Increase
% Respondents
Farm 6.5 15.9 47.9 26.1 3.7 2.95 0.910
Retailer 5.4 13.3 49.0 27.8 4.5 2.87 0.891
Indpdt. Third party 6.5 26.9 44.8 19.5 2.3 3.16 0.890
Utah State Gov. 8.2 27.8 40.5 20.1 3.4 3.17 0.957
Federal Government 10.2 26.3 38.5 19.8 5.1 3.17 1.024
All values calculated using only households included in the regression analysis below (n=353).
Distribution of Responses to Certification Types
Table 3 shows the effect of various certification methods on consumer purchases of
organic produce.vii  Note that the preponderance of responses for farm and store
certification were “no change” or “increase,” while those for the independent, state
and federal certification programs were distributed more strongly toward
“increase.”  The bottom of Table 3 reports the same information for the case where
certification would raise the price by 10 percent.  As was expected, the distribution
of responses shifted markedly toward less consumption when certification raises the
price of organic produce.R. Ward et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 7, Issue 1, 2004
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Even when certification does not increase the price, the mean is slightly above “no
change,” but has a large standard deviation.  This tells us that most consumers will
not adjust their purchases of organic produce simply because a certification
program is implemented.  However, as noted below in our regression results,
certification will increase the purchases of some consumers who are already
purchasing organic produce.  As the organic portion of the produce market is small
(Greene, 2000), the effects of certification on this segment of the market may be
substantial, even as most consumers continue to purchase conventional produce.
Estimation Results
Results from the estimations are found in Tables 4 and 6.  Recall that 450
households answered questions on purchase changes due to certification, both with
and without a price increase.  Unfortunately, 97 of these households did not answer
questions regarding their income and had to be removed from the sample.  Thus,
both regressions are run using a final data set of 353 households.
Consider first the responses to certification without a price increase, reported in
Table 4.  Larger values for household size reduce the likelihood of the respondent
greatly increasing organic purchases.  Larger household size may reduce
responsiveness because many households in Utah are quite large (Utah has the
largest average household size of the 50 states according to the US Bureau of the
Census), so that purchasing more expensive organic produce may not be
economically feasible for most families.  In contrast to Loureiro et al., number of
children under 18 was not included in our regressions, as it is highly correlated with
household size (correlation coefficient of 0.842).
Our data verify Thompson’s result that education has a non-linear relationship with
responsiveness to certification, with median education groups more responsive than
both the highly educated and those with very little schooling.  Surprisingly, higher
income reduces the likelihood of greatly increasing organic purchases.viii  Finally,
the results show that self-certification (farm and store) compared to independent
certification (federal, Utah and third party) significantly reduced the likelihood of a
large response to certification.
Just over half  (50.5%) of the responses were correctly predicted.  Given that there
were five potential categories of response, this result is quite good.  As indicated in
table 3, over 94% of responses were predicted within one level.  Marginal effects for
significant variables are reported in Table 5.  Because all regressors are discrete,
and many are categorical, reported effects give the change in the probability of
response falling in each category when the variable listed changes from its smallest
value to its largest value.  Education appears to have the largest absolute effect on
the purchase responsiveness to certification, followed more distantly by income,
household size and the certifying agencies (farm or store).R. Ward et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 7, Issue 1, 2004
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Table 4: Ordered Probit: Dependent Variable = Change in Purchase of Certified
Organic Produce, No Price Increase (n=353)
Variable Coefficient Std Error P Value
Constant1 1.402*** 0.432 0.001
Constant2 2.792*** 0.439 0.000
Constant3 4.237*** 0.451 0.000
Constant4 5.098*** 0.458 0.000
Buy Organic 0.039 0.042 0.341
Age 0.102 0.124 0.409
Age2 -0.027 0.018 0.134
Gender 0.118 0.083 0.155
Education -1.22*** 0.211 0.000
Education2 0.139*** 0.025 0.000
Household Size -0.04* 0.023 0.084
Income -0.054** 0.029 0.059
Farm Certification -0.406*** 0.085 0.000
Store Certification -0.461*** 0.077 0.000
Independent Certification 0.053 0.072 0.463
Utah State Gov. Cert. 0.002 0.043 0.961
Log Likelihood (constant only) -2677.5525




*** significant at 1% ** significant at 5% * significant at 10%
While there were 2,250 observations (450 households) for the dependent variable, only 1,765
observations (353 households) were used due to non-responses to income question.
Dependent Variable: 1=greatly decrease purchases to 5=greatly increase purchases.  Coefficients
give change in probability that dependent variable has higher value.
Table 5:  Ordered Probit, Effect of a Change from Lowest to Highest Category,
Significant Regressors Only;  Dependent Variable = Change in Purchase of Certified
Organic Produce, No Price Increase
Greatly
Increase Increase No Change Decrease
Greatly
Decrease
Income -.0551 -.0946 .0937 .0443 .0117
Education* -.3952 .043 .3013 .0443 .0065
Household Size -.0031 -.0134 -.0010 .0148 .0027
Farm Cert -.0125 -.0199 .0211 .009 .0022
Store Cert -.0143 -.0225 .0241 .0101 .0025
*This number represents total effect of education (accounting for both the linear and quadratic
terms)R. Ward et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 7, Issue 1, 2004
 2004 International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IAMA). All rights reserved. 72
Table 6: Ordered Probit: Dependent Variable = Change in Purchase of Certified
Organic Produce with Price Increase (n=353)
Variable Coefficient Std Error P Value
Constant1 0.889 0.607 0.1432
Constant2 2.072*** 0.614 0.0007
Constant3 3.409*** 0.631 0.0000
Constant4 4.732*** 0.68 0.0000
Buy Organic 0.028 0.053 0.6013
Age 0.132 0.143 0.3568
Age2 -0.021 0.02 0.3018
Gender -0.184* 0.099 0.063
Education -0.621** 0.315 0.0485
Education2 0.068* 0.037 0.0671
Household Size -0.056* 0.032 0.0757
Income 0.029 0.039 0.4536
Farm Certification -0.111* 0.061 0.0677
Store Certification -0.18*** 0.058 0.0017
Indep Certification -0.038 0.049 0.4471
Utah State Gov. Cert. 0.009 0.033 0.7956
Increase Org. Purchase -0.889*** 0.177 0.0000
No Change Org. Pur. -1.399*** 0.187 0.0000
Decrease Org. Pur. -2.171*** 0.2375 0.0000
Greatly Decr. Org. Pur. -3.561*** 0.43 0.0000
Log Likelihood (constant only) -3000.4059
Log Likelihood (constant + regressors) -2089.7296
Correctly Predicted 49.2%
Predicted within 1 level 94.3%
*** significant at 1% ** significant at 5% * significant at 10%
While there were 3,120 observations (624 households) for the dependent variable, only 1,765
observations (353 households) were used due to non-responses to income and certification without a
price increase questions.
Dependent Variable: 1=greatly decrease purchases to 5=greatly increase purchases.  Coefficients
give change in probability that dependent variable has higher value.
Next, the response to certification was analyzed for the case in which certification
would raise the price by 10 percent.  Results are reported in Table 6.  In contrast to
the earlier regression (where gender was not significant), the sign on gender is now
negative, suggesting that women are more sensitive to price increases.
The coefficient on household size remains significant.  As before, this suggests that
a price increase places a greater burden on larger households, causing purchases of
organic produce to decrease for larger households.  The coefficients on education
and education squared also remain highly significant, with the same signs as in the
first regression.  It appears that those with median education levels are least
responsive to a price increase.  Of the certification types, both farm and store
certification are significant which implies that these (non-independent) certification
types are least credible, and that the price increase has a similar effect on responses
to all other types of certification.R. Ward et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 7, Issue 1, 2004
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The dummy variables on responses to certification without a price increase are all
very significant and behave as was hypothesized.  All groups have smaller
purchases with the price increase, with the size of the reduction being smallest for
those who would have increased organic purchases without the price increase. As
expected, the largest decrease came from the group that responded most negatively
to certification.
Just under half (49.2%) of responses were correctly predicted by this model.  As
with the earlier regression, this is quite good, considering that there are five
possible categories.  As before, over 94 percent (94.3%) of responses are predicted
within one level.  Marginal effects (Table 7) in this model are much smaller than in
the previous model.  The size of the marginal effects suggests that all groups are
equally responsive to a price increase for certification.
Table 7: Ordered Probit, Effect of a Change from Lowest to Highest Category,
Significant Regressors Only;  Dependent variable = Change in Purchase of Certified
Organic Produce with Price Increase
Greatly
Increase Increase No Change Decrease
Greatly
Decrease
Gender 1.92E-14 -7.76E-14 -5.09E-10 -6.96E-7 6.96E-7
Education* -1.22E-15 -8.24E-12 -3.35E-8 -2.22E-5 2.23E-5
Household Size 0 -1.66E-15 -1.884E-11 -3.454E-8 3.456E-8
Farm Cert 0 -5.44E-15 -5.01E-11 -7.22E-8 7.23E-8
Store Cert 0 -9.44E-15 -8.54E-11 -1.22E-7 1.22E-7
Increase Org. Purch -3E-15 -1.78E-11 -6.26E-8 -3.64E-5 3.65E-5
No Change Org. Purch -1.51E-13 -4.96E-10 -9.03E-7 -2.77E-4 2.78E-4
Decrease Org. Purch -3.44E-11 -4.65E-8 -3.12E-5 -3.64E-3 3.67E-3
Grtly Decr Org. Purch -1.43E-7 -3.90E-5 -4.46E-3 -.0941 .0986
*This number represents total effect of education (accounting for both the linear and quadratic
terms)
Conclusions
Information asymmetry exists and may cause problems in the organic produce
market because of the difficulty consumers face in determining whether a product is
truly organic.  It may be eliminated through the use of signals, reputation, and
certification or licensing.  Signals based on appearance of organic versus
conventional produce may not be effective, as there is some evidence that organic
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difficult to apply in this case because the consumer often does not know whether the
produce was indeed organically grown, or which farmer raised it. The usefulness of
certification depends in large part upon the credibility it has with consumers.  If
consumers do not believe certification claims, information asymmetry problems
remain.
The results of a survey of Utah consumers suggest that consumers do perceive a
difference in certification methods.  Self-certification, where an individual farmer or
store certifies that produce is organically grown does not seem as effective as
independent certification (i.e. third party or government).  Not surprisingly,
consumers seem to place more faith in an outside party certifying growing methods.
However, it does not appear that there are large differences between the
independent certification methods.  This implies that a certification program
established by the federal government would not influence consumer purchasing
behavior differently than certification by the state of Utah, or by independent third
parties.  With a national certification program for organic produce in place, state
governments need not devise their own certification procedures in order to increase
consumer purchases of organic product.  Of course this study is of Utah consumers
only, and thus may not generalize to states with pre-existing independent and
state-run certification programs such as California and Oregon.
The results here suggest that the only benefit to having a state government or
third-party certification program would be differences in standards for organic
produce.  Such a program would have to educate consumers not only on the
standards of their program and how they differ from the federal program, but would
have to convince consumers that such differences in standards are valuable.  Given
that 75 percent of respondents were aware of certification programs but only 10
percent looked for them when purchasing organic produce (Table 2), this may be a
difficult task.  It may be that consumers in states such as California and Oregon,
where pre-existing state and third-party programs have been in place for some time,
may take a certification program that they recognise more seriously, so that a
greater percentage would look for it when making organic produce purchases.
The respondents were sensitive to increases in price and the response was similar
for all certification methods.  Response to certification without a price increase
(used as a proxy for belief in certification) was significant in explaining a response
to certification with a price increase.  While a 10 percent price increase always
reduces the propensity to purchase, it does so most for those who would make little
adjustments to their purchases even without the price increase.  Those who are less
likely to buy certified organic are most likely to reduce their purchases if
certification increases the price.  People who indicated certification would increase
their purchases showed the least sensitivity to price.
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Given that even those who would greatly increase their purchases if produce were
certified adjusted their responses downward in the face of a 10 percent price
increase, it may be that certification, if it increases the price, would not have a very
large effect on purchases of organic produce.  However, organic produce is a small
portion of the market, and a response large enough to have a significant effect on
the organic produce market may exist, even as most people continue to consume
conventional produce.
While it is difficult to generalize results of studies from a single state to the United
States as a whole, our results on certification are consistent with other studies of
organic produce (whether certified or not).  This suggests that these results could be
representative of other areas in the United States.  However, Utah demographics
are not completely representative of the United States (e.g. household sizes are
largest of any of the 50 states in Utah).  Also, Utah did not have an established
state government certification program, as did other states.  Thus, while these
results are consistent with other studies on other areas of the United States, it
would be necessary to examine the question of certification on a much broader
sample before reaching hard and fast conclusions about a national response to the
federal certification program.
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End Notes
i In addition to the theoretical literature, Akerlof’s idea appears in several areas
including information labeling on food (Caswell and Mojduszka), product safety
(Kerton and Bodell), job markets (Ryoo) and yard sales (Cabral and Sakovics).
ii It is assumed that information asymmetry between the farmer and the wholesaler
carries through to the final customer.  Thus, while we discuss the consumer’s beliefs
regarding the farmer’s production methods, we mean to imply the consumer’s
beliefs regarding the entire system from which she purchases.R. Ward et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 7, Issue 1, 2004
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iii Klonsky gives a good overview of what has happened in regards to certification,
including the problems the USDA has faced in forming a standard for certification.
iv We focus on produce as it is something that most households purchase,
organically produced versions are widely available, and conventionally grown and
organically grown produce are generally sold in the same section of the store, and
have similar packaging.
v A copy of the survey is available from the authors upon request.
vi Our regression specification is similar to a fixed-effects model.  While this is not
ideal, a random-effects ordered probit model (attempted using both LIMDEP
(Greene, 2001) and SAS) failed to generate useable results, despite manipulations of
both the models and the data.  It is likely that the qualitative nature of almost all
the independent variables led to a failure of the random-effects algorithms to
converge.
vii These questions were posed to the 450 respondents who indicated that
certification was important.  Howerver, results were calculated using the 353
respondents who were included in the regression analysis below. In pre-testing the
survey, consumers who indicated certification was unimportant to them were also
unable to respond to how certification would affect their purchases.  Given that
certification is unimportant, it is assumed that various types of certification would
have no effect on purchases of organic produce.
viii When regressions are run with dummy variables for income levels, only level 1
(under $15,000) remains significant, while the signs and significance of all other
variables remains as reported in Table 4.